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The Battle of Pea Ridge
BY EDWIN C. BEAKSS
RESEARCH HISTOBIAN, VICKSBUEG NATIONAL MILITARY PARK
January and early Febmary, 1862 was a busy period for Brigadier
General Samuel R. Curtis, recently appointed commander of the Army
of the Southwest. At both the Rolla railhead and the advance base at
Lebanon, Missouri, the Union build up was rushed. As soon as he had
completed preparations, Curtis planned to employ his army to drive
the pro-Secessionist forces out of southwestern Missouri.
On February 10, Curtis led his army out of Lebanon. Forging rapidly
ahead, the Federals closed in on Springfield. The Northerners entered
Springfield on the morning of the 13th, only to find that Major General
Sterling Price's Missourians had evacuated the principal city of the
Ozarks. After pausing less than one day, Curtis pressed on after the
retreating Rebels. Unable to group his troops for a stand in Missouri,
Price retired into northwestern Arkansas. Soon after crossing the border.
Price's troops rendezvoused with Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch's
command. Unable to agree on a joint plan of action the two Gonfederate
leaders and their troops retired into the fastnesses of the rugged Boston
Mountains.
Gurtis decided against following the Rebels any deeper into Arkansas.
The rapid advance had stretched his suppl>- line to the breaking point.
Supplies were getting short. The Army of the Southwest was in need
of reinforcements, men and materiel. Gurtis called a halt. To subsist
and forage his army, Gurtis dispersed his army in a wide front in north-
western Arkansas.
In the meantime, the recently appointed Gonfederate commander of
the Trans-Mississippi District, Major General Earl Van Dom, decided
to take charge of operations in northwest Arkansas. Leaving his head-
quarters at Poeahontas, Arkansas, Van Dom started for the Boston
Mountains. Reaching the army camps on March 3, Van Dorn took
charge. The next day, he put his "Army of the West" into motion. Van
Dom planned to strike Gurtis before he could regroup his troops.
On the 5th, Gurtis learned of the Gonfederates' approach. Orders were
issued for the Army of the Southwest to concentrate behind Little Sugar
Greek. The Rebel vanguard on Mareh 6 overtook part of Brigadier
General Franz Sigel's command as it was evacuating Bentonville. A
running fight ensued. Sigel's troops fought their way through several
roadblocks and reached Little Sugar Greek. Van Dorn had failed to
defeat Gurtis' army in detail. The stage was set now for the climatic
battle which would decide the fate of Missouri and possibly the Union.
PART I
Satisfied that Sigel's rear guard which was covering the
Union withdrawal from Bentonville had escaped, Ceneral
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Van Dorn halted his army at Camp Stephens late on the af-
ternoon of March 6. As soon as tbe pickets were posted, or-
ders were issued for tbe troops to fall out. Fires were kindled.
Since there was snow on tbe ground and a cold nortb wind
blowing, tbe soldiers huddled around the roaring fires. The
lucky ones wbo still had some corn left in tbeir knapsacks,
parched it in the asbes.^
Others like Sergeant W. Kinney of tbe 3d Louisiana were
not so fortunate. Tbe sergeant recalled tbat it was ahnost
dark wben he and bis comrades stopped. Tbey were "almost
frozen and stai-ved, baving only one biscmt for breakfast that
morning, and no prospect of supper. We built fires, and sat
around tliem waiting for tbe wagons to arrive."-
When tbe Confederates baited, Ceneral Price's vanguard
bivouacked on the north side of Little Sugar Creek about four
miles west of tbe strong position taken up by Ceneral Curtis
Army of tbe Soutbwest. During tbe afternoon. Van Doms
column bad been strengtliened by tbe arrival of Brigadier
Ceneral Albert Pike's brigade-two regiments of Cberokee
Mounted Rifles and a squadron of Texas cavalrymen.
In response to Van Dom's call for reinforcements. Pike bad
left Cantonment Davis in tbe Indian Territory on February
28. The general had been accompanied by Captain Otis G.
Welcb's squadron of Texans (wbo were assigned to tbe 1st
Regiment of Cboctaw and Cbickasaw Mounted Rifies) and the
1st Creek Regiment. Since tlie Indians bad not been paid.
Pike bad a difficult time persuading tbem to take tbe field. He
was only able to do so by telling tbem tbat tbey would receive
their money by tbe time the column forded tbe IlUnois River.
From Cantonment Davis, tbe general proceeded to Park Hill.
Here, he paused for a day waiting for tlie rest of tbe Choctaw
and Cbickasaw Mounted Rifles to join bim.
In tbe meantime, a courier reached Pike's headquarters
late on Marcb 3 witb an urgent message from Ceneral Van
Dorn. Pike was informed that tlie Army of tbe West was in
motion, and he was to join it near Fayetteville by tbe evemng
hd1 Ephraim McD. Anderson, Memoirs, Historical and Personal;^nchd
ing the Campaigns of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade (St. Louis
1868), 166. .
2 W. H. Timnard, A Southern Record, The History of the Third Regi-
ment Louisiana Infantry (Baton Ronge, 1866), 136.
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of March 4. This message caused Pike to shake his head. He
knew it would be impossible for him to keep the projected
rendezvous. Calling for Colonel Douglas H. Cooper, his second
in command. Pike told him to take charge of the column and
march into northwestern Arkansas. Pike, accompanied by
Welch's squadron, would push on and pick up the two regi-
ments of Cherokee Mounted Riñes.^
Passing through Evansville and Cincinnati, Pike reached
die Cherokee line on the 4th, where he overtook Colonel Stand
Watie's 1st Regiment of Cherokee Mounted Rifles. ( Watie and
Colonel John Drew [who commanded the 2d Regiment of
Cherokee Mounted Rifles], acting in accordance with in-
structions from Van Dorn's headquarters on the 3d, had taken
the field without waiting for Pike.) Undoubtedly, Pike was
miifed by this breach in military etiquette.
Nightfall on tlie 5th found Pike's command camped at
Freschlag's Mill. Colonel Cooper's column had lagged far be-
hind. On March 6, Pike reached Smith's Mill, where he over-
took Drew's regiment. During the afternoon. Pike's troopers
fell in behind Ceneral McCulloch's infantry. As a result of
circumstances beyond his control. Pike had joined the army
48 hours later than Van Dorn had intended. In addition, ap-
projdmately one-half his effective force under Colonel Cooper
was a good two day's march farther back along the road from
the Indian Temtoiy,*
The arrival of Pike's brigade increased Van Dorn's strik-
ing force to about 16,000 effectives. Since the soldiers of the
Army of the West had left their camps deep in tlie Boston
Mountains tbree days before, tlie officers had pushed them
hard. Many of the infantiynien were fagged out. Wlien Van
Dorn discussed the situation with his officers and scouts, they
told him that Curtis' Little Sugar Creek line was very formid-
able. A frontal attack could result in a bloody repulse. Van
Dorn determined to see if it were possible to maneuver the
Federals out of their earthworks. The general knew that two
of his generals (Benjamin McCulIoch and James Mclntosh)
^ The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies ( 69 vols, and index; Washington,
1880-1900), Series I, Vol. VIII, 286-287, 764. (Cites hereafter as O. R.)
•• Ibid., 287, 764.
ANNALS OF IOWA
had spent many months in Benton County. He summoned
them to a staff meeting.^
From these two officers. Van Dorn learned tliat near Camp
Stephens a road branched off to the left from the road as-
cending the Little Sugar Creek bottom. This road, known as
tlie Bentonville Detour, passed north of Pea Ridge and joined
the Telegraph road several miles north of Elkhorn Tavern.
Thus by making a march of ten miles. Van Dorn would be
able to avoid a costly frontal attack. Upon reaching the Tele-
graph road. Van Dorn's gain would be two-fold: Not only
would he have turned Curtis' position, but he would be astride
the communication line which linked Curtis' Army of the
Southwest with its supply depots at Springfield and Rolla,
Missouri. If the Confederates could hold this position, the Fed-
erals would face annihilation.«
There were certain hazards inherent in the Confederates
plan of attack. To be successful, it required rapid marches,
precise timing, and secrecy. Van Dorn determined to strike
immediately. The troops would be called on to make a night
march. Even so, Curtis might learn of the movement or Van
Dorn might fail to get his army in position to attack at dawn.
If this happened, the maneuver would be disclosed to Curtis
with possible disasterous consequences for the Southerners.
Van Dora felt confident that the Yankees would see the
glare from his camp fires. This, he theorized, would serve to
allay their fears of a night march on the Confederates part.
Brigadier Ceneral Martin E. Creen's division of the Missouri
State Cuard would be left to guard the trains. Creen's soldiers
could be expected to keep the camp fires burning throughout
the long, cold night.'' .
It was about 8 p.m. when Ceneral Price turned out his
Missourians. Before putting his column in motion. Price told
Green to make sure that his men kept the fires roarmg. Gen-
eral Van Dorn and his staff accompanied Ceneral Price.
(Since he was quite ill. Van Dorn rode in an ambulance.) As
5 Walter L. Brown, "Pea Ridge: Gettysburg of the West," T/ie Arkan-
sas Historical Quarterly, XV, II; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 283.
0 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 283; Franz Sigel^  "The Pea Ridge Cam-
paign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, R V. Johnson and C. C.
Buel, eds., 4 vols. (New York, 1884-1887), I, 320.
7 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 283, 317.
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tlie Missourians took up the march, Golonel Henry Little's
combat-ready brigade took the lead. Little assigned Golonel
John Q. Burbridge's 2d Missouri Infantry tlie advance.«
There was a great deal of confusion as the night march be-
gan. Because Price's Missourians had forded Little Sugar
Greek before the halt, they at first made satisfactory pro-
gress. McGuUoch's cavalry under Mclntosh experienced no
difficulty in crossing the stream. By the time the Missourians
and tlie troopers were out of the way it was 10 o'clock. Golonel
Louis Hébert, who led McGulloch's infantiy brigade, passed
die word for his unit commanders to arouse their men. Since
the soldiers were to travel in light marching order, they left
their blanket rolls behind.
AVhen the head of the column reached the Little Sugar
Greek ford, it was discovered that no provision had been
made for bridging the icy waters. Finally, two poles were
secured and laid side by side, to facilitate the crossing of the
infantry. Nevertheless, it was almost daybreak before tlie
last of Hébert's footsoldiers had crossed. The units which had
forded first pushed on. After marching about five miles. Ma-
jor William F. Tunnard of the 3d Louisiana halted his regi-
ment. Since the Louisianians had hiked 26 miles, tliey needed
rest badly. Evidently forgetting that the march was to be
veiled in secrecy, tlie rugged Louisianians ripped down fenc-
es, using the rails to build fires around which they huddled.
One of the soldiers wrote, "It was impossible to sleep, for the
night was bitter cold; no one will ever know how much we
suffered from cold and hunger; no tongue or pen can paint it.^
General Pike's troopers, who followed Hébert's infantry,
mounted their horses and moved out at midnight. The Indians
soon overtook and passed McGulloch's train. ^Vhen he reached
Little Sugar Greek, Pike was compelled to call a halt to wait
for Hébert's men to cross on tlieir "little bridge of rails." It
8 Ihid., 305, 307; Anderson, History of the First Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 166; Emily Miller, A Soldiers Honor, with Reminiscences of
Major General Earl Van Dorn (New York, 1902), 74.
» Tunnard, History of the 3d Louisiana, 137; W. L. Gammage, The
Camp, the Bivouac, and the Battle Field, (Selma, 1864), 21-36. Since
the night was exceedingly cold, there was a great deal of suffering among
the soldiers as they stood in ranks, waiting for the units ahead to cross
the stream. W. L. Gammage recalled, "For my part I shall retain a
hvely and unpleasant recollection of my suffering on that wretched
night, for my whole natural life tiine."
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was sunrise before the last of the infantrymen were out of
the way. Pike's Indians resumed the march, turning into tlie
Bentonville Detour.^"
Van Dorn expected to reach a point in the Federals' rear
near Elkhorn Tavern before daybreak. At first. Price's troops
made satisfactory progress. Van Dorn began to feel confident.
About midnight. Colonel Burbridge's advance guard found
tlie road blocked with feUed timber. A halt had to be called,
while the pioneers were put to work clearing a route through
tlie obstructions.^"^
e « «
An Iowan was responsible for obstructing the Bentonville
Detour. If the road had not been blocked and Price's column
delayed for several critical hours, it is very likely that the
Confederates would have scored a smashing victory in the
impending battle.
About 4 o'clock on the previous afternoon, several of Colonel
Crenville M. Dodge's scouts reported Confederate pati-ols re-
connoitering the Bentonville Detour.^^ Dodge, realizing the
importance of this information, rode over to speak with
Ceneral Curtis.
At this hour, the general was supervising the construction
of an artillery emplacement on a bluff east of, and command-
ing, the ford where the Telegraph road crossed Little Sugar
Creek. Dodge informed Curtis that the Confederates were ap-
parently feeling their way around the Union right. Further-
more, he added with remarkable foresight, the Rebels might
use the Bentonville Detour to gain the rear of the Army of
the Southwest. If the Bentonville Detour were obstiaicted it
would delay the Southerners, Dodge pointed out.
Curtis reacted to Dodge's advice immediately. A staff ofii-
cer was sent with instructions for one of tlie regimental com-
manders to proceed to the Bentonville Detour and start fell-
10 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 287.
iiiZj/d., 307.
12 Grenville M. Dodge, "Personal Biography of Major Gf^f'^ ;^ ^ '^" '
ville Mellen Dodge 1831 to 1870," Vol. I, 49-52 This unpubhshed manu-
script is in the General Grenville M. Dodge collection Iowa State Dept.
of History and Archives, Des Moines, Iowa Grenville M. Dodge who
had been bom in Massachusetts in 1831, caled Gounc.l Bluffs his homa
Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers in the War of the «?'^f " ' « " ^ "
with Historical Sketches of Volunteer Organizations
Moines, 1908), 534.
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ing timber. For some unexplained reason, this order was not
carried out. When he learned tbat tbe designated unit was
still in camp, Curtis sent for Dodge. He told his fellow Iowans,
"You know tbe country, go and do it.''^ ^
Replying, Dodge remarked that his men had been on tbe
road most of the night, but he would do wbat bis general
wisbed.^*
Wben he moved out. Colonel Dodge took witli him a battal-
ion of the 4th Iowa Infantry and two companies of the 3d Iowa
Cavalry. By 9 p.m. Dodge bad reached tbe Bentonville De-
tour. Dividing his men into two teams. Dodge put tbem to
work felling timber. The infanhy blocked the detour near its
junction with the Telegraph road, while the cavalrymn worked
several miles to the ^^
An Iowa cavalrymen recalled:
We had a captain in our regiment, O. H. P. Scott . . .
who had been a railroad builder, and was always ready
for a job of road building or timber cutting; and on the
night of the 6th he was detailed, with a number of men
13 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52.
i-t Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 258. On the night of March 5,
Colonel Dodge's brigade, along with the other units of Carr's division,
had retired from Cross Hollow to Little Sugar Creek.
15 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52. The 4th Iowa Infantry was
organized under the proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln
dated May 3, 1861. The companies constituting the regiment were
mustered into Federal service at two places—Camp Kirkwood near
Council Bluffs and Jefferson Barracks, Missouri—between August 8 and
31, 1861. Grenville Dodge was commissioned colonel and placed in
command of the regiment by Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood. Originally,
it was planned to employ the companies which had been organized at
Council Bluffs to repel an invasion of Iowa by the Missouri State Guard.
Before the Iowans were ready to move, the Secessionists contingents
in northwest Mis.soiiri had disbanded.
The companies of the 4th Iowa which had been mustered in at Gouncil
Bhiffs were sent to St. Louis. By August 15, all the companies except
I and K had reached Benton Barraeks.
On August 24, the eight companies left Benton Barracks for Rolla.
The 4th Iowa remained at Rolla for over four months. Gompanies I and
K were mustered into Federal service on August 31. After leaving Benton
Barracks on Septemlaer 13, tbe two companie.s joined the regiment at
Rolla. In the following months, detachments of one or more companies
were sent on reconnoitering e.xpeditions. In the period from November
1-9, combat patrols from the 4th Iowa visited Houston and Salem,
Missouri.
No important movements were undertaken by the Iowans untü January
22, 1862. At that time, the regiment (as a unit in General Gurtis' Army
of the Southwest ) left Rolla. Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers, I, 527.
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. [to assist Colonel Dodge]. Our cavalrymen thought
this was not the branch of service they had enlisted for.ie
When he inspected the work. Dodge was satisfied that his
men had done a good job. Orders were issued for the officers
to reform their units and return to their camps. Two compan-
ies of the 4th Iowa under Captian Samuel D. Nichols inad-
vertently followed the troopers of the 3d Iowa westward along
the Bentonville Detour. When Dodge learned what had hap-
pened he went to look for Captain Nichols. Fortunately for
tlie Iowans, Price's vanguard was making a lot of noise as it
pushed ahead. As soon as he heard the sounds of the ap-
proaching greyclads, Nichols turned his column around. En-
countering Dodge, Nichols told him what he had seen."
Dodge's detachment was back in camp by 2 a.m. As the
colonel was getting ready to retire. Adjutant James A. Will-
iamson of the 4tli Iowa came in and reported that he had not
"seen a picket on our whole right Hank." This alarmed
Dodge. Hastening to Curtis' headquarters. Dodge awakened
the general. Besides telHng the general that the Bentonville
Detour had been obstinicted. Dodge reported the Confed-
erates were making a night march and would "sti-ike us on the
right and in the rear." To make matters worse. Dodge contin-
ued, he had learned that there were no Union outposts nortli-
west of Leetown. Ctóis apparently had received other infor-
mation. Dodge recaUed, because he didn't seem to place
much importance on what he heard from the colonel. At this.
Dodge returned to his tent,"
o » o
After losing valuable time clearing a way through the ob-
;:r A»?^ÄÄ A S A
of Iowa Soldiers, IV, 591.
IT Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52. Nichols, who called Panora
his home, had been commissioned 1st lieutenant of Company U «n
Iowa on August 8, 1861. He had been advanced to the rank of captain
on December 25. Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers, 1, b25.
18 Dodge, "Personal Biography," I, 49-52. A resident of Des Moines
Williamson had been made regimental adjutant at the time «f ¿he 4tn
Iowa's muster into Federal Service. Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers,
I, 535.
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structions. Price's column pushed ahead. Just before day-
break. Dodge's second barricade was encountered. For a sec-
ond time, the Missourians were compelled to stop, while Bur-
bridge's footsoldiers cut a path through the felled timber. By
6 a.m., Burbridge pronounced the road open. The troops
moved off. The damage had been done, however. It was 8
o'clock before Price's main column reached the junction of
the Bentonville Detour and the Telegraph road.^"
As Burbridge's soldiers were starting to descend into the
valley of Big Sugar Creek through which the Telegraph road
ran, the rumble of moving vehicles was heard. Pressing their
ears to the ground, the Confederate scouts heard wagons ap-
proaching from tlie soutli. Colonel Burbridge was afriad Cur-
tis had divined the Confederate's intentions and had started
to retreat. He sent a runner to see Colonel Little with a re-
quest for artilleiy. Witliin a few minutes the six guns manned
by Captain William Wade's cannoneers came thundering up.
\'\''ade had his artillerists throw tlieir smoothbores into battery
about 100 yards from the road. The guns were masked by a
thick wood.
According to the brigade historian:
The ground was frozen, and the noise eould be distinetly
lieard some distance up the . . . [canyon]. In a few minutes
a train of wagons was dimly seen advancing in the dark-
ness. It was immediately halted and captured, the men with
it e.xpressing the greatest surprise at seeing an enemy there.
They were sent out for forage, and said they knew nothing
of the movements of the army [Curtis'], exeept that it
was preparing to fight.-"
As the head of his column turned into the Telegraph road,
Ceneral Price ordered his escort under Lieutenant Colonel
James T. Cearnal to take the lead. Price's Missourians, al-
though delayed, had gained Curtis' rear and were astride his
supply line. Screened by Cearnal's troopers the Confederates
pushed up Cross Timber Hollow.
Realizing tliat they must soon contact the foe. General Price
and Colonel Little rode at tlie head of the column. For the
time being, the two officers' command post would be with
Burbridge's 2d Missouri. In case of trouble. Price and Little
wanted to be the first to know about it.
m O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 305, 307.
2u Anderson, History of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade, 167.
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About a mile and one-half north of Elkliorn Tavern, tlie
Telegraph road crossed Big Sugar Greek and veered sharply
to the right. At this point. Gross Timber Hollow narrowed.
Golonel Cearnal cautioned liis troopers to be on the lookout
for ambuscades. The 2d Missouri tramped along in column by
platoons close behind Geamal's horsemen. Behind Bur-
bridge's combat-ready regiment marched the other units of
Price's command. ^ ^
It was almost daybreak before the rear contingents of Hé-
bert's infantry overtook tlie advance units. As soon as Major
Tunnard learned that the rear echelon was approaching, he
turned out the men of tlie 3d Louisiana. The order, "Fall in!"
rang out. A soldier reported, the troops " 'fell in' to a man,
but such a wornout set of men I never saw. They had not one
single mouthful of food to eat."" Preceded by Mclntosh's
cavalry and followed by Pike's Indians, Hébert's footsoldiers
trudged up the Bentonville Detour.
Van Dorn was disturbed by Price's failure to be in position
near Elkhorn Tavern by daybreak. He was afraid the Fed-
erals would redeploy their troops to oppose the Gonfederates
as they debouched from Gross Timlaer Hollow. Since the
Yankees would be on the watershed, he reasoned, they could
probably keep him from forming liis army. Van Dom decided
to alter his master plan.
An aide was sent galloping back along the Bentonville De-
tour with instructions for McGulloch to countemiarch his
command. Turning into one of the country lanes passing
around the western face of Pea Ridge, McGulloch was to ad-
vance toward Leetown. Thus, Van Dorn had determined to
undertake a converging attack. Such an operation is always
dangerous. This was especially true in the days when mes-
sages had to be carried by horsemen, and at a stage of the
Givil War when many of tlie officers were getting their first
opportunity of handling large numbers of men in the field.
Furthermore, Van Dorn's two assaulting columns would be
separated by Pea Ridge, an all but impassable barrier. If the
Federals could keep the converging arms from closing, they
21 Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 305, 307, 329.
22 Tunnard, History of the 3d Louisiana, 137.
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would have a good chance of defeating their numerically su-
perior foe in detail.-*
By the time the staff officer reached McCulloeh, all of his
units had passed around the northwestern comer of Pea
Ridge. McCulloeh wasted no time in turning his command
around. Tliis worked a special hardship on Hébert's infantry-
men, because they had to countennarch three miles before
they reached the country lanes leading southeastward toward
Leetown.-'*
o » e
While the Confederates spent the night of March 6 on the
road, Curtis' Army of tlie Soudiwest (except Dodge's working
party) rested quietly in its chosen position overlooking Little
Sugar Creek. Ceneral Curtis who expected an attack from
the south or southwest had made his dispositions accordingly.
Brigadier Ceneral Alexander Asboth's division held the right
of tlie Little Sugar Creek line, its right Hank anchored near
the wood road ascending Winton's Spring Branch. Colonel Pe-
ter J. Osterhaus' division was on Asboth's left. Colonel Jeffer-
son C. Davis' was in the center. One of his brigades was to
the right of and the other to the left of the Telegraph road.
Colonel Eugene A. Carr's division held the Union left. The
Commanders of the two right flank divisions, Asboth and Os-
terhaus, reported to Ceneral Sigel.
Unlike Curtis, Ceneral Sigel doubted that the Rebels would
make a frontal attack. He likened it to knocking one's head
against a stonewall. Sigel expected the main Confederate
blo\ '^ to be delivered from the west against his right flank di-
vision, Asboth's. To see if he could leam tlie Soutlierners'
intentions, Sigel sent his two chief scouts (Brown and Pope)
with a mounted patrol to reconnoiter the countiyside west of
Winton's Spring Branch and Leetown.^ ^
About daybreak, the scouts returned. Awakening Sigel, they
informed him that "troops and trains of the enemy were mov-
ing the whole night on the Bentonville . . . [Detour] around
our rear, towards Cross Timber [Hollow], thereby endan-
2» O. fi.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 283-284, 287; Gammage, The Camp, the
Bivouac, and the Battle Field, 25-26.
-•• Tunnard, History of the 3d Louisiana, 137; O. fi.. Series I, Vol.
VIII, 287.
25 Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Gampaign," Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War, I, 321.
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gering our line of retreat and communications to Keetsville,
and separating us from our reenforcements and provision
trains."^^
Sigel, after listening to tliis report, sent for Lieutenant Louis
Schramm of bis staff. Scbramm was to take Sigel's escort
and see if be could obtain additional informations. Sigel want-
ed to know in wbat direction tbe greyclads were moving. It
was several bours before Scbramm's patrol returned. When
it did, tbe staff officer corraborated tbe intelligence brought
in earlier by tlie scouts.^''
It was after 6 a.m., Scbramm's report "left no doubt in"
Sigel's "mind tbat tbe enemy was moving around our position
toward the nortlieast. . ." Sigel now rode out bimself. Like
his scouts and Lieutenant Scbramm, the Ceneral was able to
spot Confederate troops and trains moving rapidly along tbe
Bentonville Detour. A staff officer was sent to carry tbese evil
tidings to Ceneral Curtis.-^
Following tbe receipt of tbis unpleasant news, Ceneral Cur-
tis called a meeting wbicb was attended by bis chief subordi-
nates. The officers assembled at Ceneral Asboth's tent, near
Lewis Pratt's Store. After Curtis had listened to all tbe reports,
he realized that tbe Confederates were turning bis fortified
line. The battle would not be fouglit as be bad planned.
As Colonel Dodge recalled, most of tbe officers on bearing
this information expressed themselves as favoring a retreat.
He and Colonel Davis, however, voiced violent opposition to
such a movement. Colonel Osterhaus tbougbt it would be a
good idea if tbe Federals could place Cross Timber Hollow
"in our front instead of rear."
To strengthen Curtis' hand. Dodge reminded tbe general,
"we had come there [into nortbwest Arkansas] to figbt;
that it would never do for us to refuse, now that we had an
opportunity; and that for us to retreat would ruin us, and
him, especially in Iowa."
Encouraged by Dodge's words, Curtis prepared to meet tbis
new threat. The Army of the Southwest would change front
to the rear, so as to face the Bentonville Detour. At tbe same
26 Ibid.; O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 211.
27 Ibid.
2S Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Gampaign," Battles and Leaders of the Cwd
War, I, 321.
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time, Curtis did not know whether Van Dom was using all
or part of his army to flank the Union position. Consequently,
Curtis would be unable to pull all of his troops out of the
Little Sugar Creek defenses.-"
When the army carried out the projected change of front,
it would reverse the order in which the divisions were deploy-
ed. Asboth's and Osterhaus' whieh had been on the right
would now be on the left. These two units which constituted
Sigel'á wing were to continue to hold the Little Sugar Creek
line. Davis' division would be in the center, while Carr's be-
came the extreme right.^°
Before dismissing the officers, Curtis announced he was go-
ing to send Colonel Cyrus Bussey witli a strong mounted force
toward Leetown. Bussey's column would be accompanied by
tliree guns manned by the 1st Missouri Flying Artillery. After
passing beyond Leetown, Bussey was to strike the Rebel col-
umn whicii was reportedly advancing around the southwest-
ern face of Pea Ridge.
Curtis, turning to Colonel Osterhaus, asked the Cerman to
accompany Colonel Bussey "for the purpose of taking con-
trol of the movement." Since up to this moment, the Confed-
erates had not made the slightest demonstration against the
Little Sugar Creek line, Sigel advanced the suggestion that
Curtis support Bussey's cavahy with a brigade of infantry
and a second battery from his wing. He argued that if the
cavalry were unsupported and suffered a repulse, it might
have serious consequences. Curtis adopted Sigel's proposition.
When Osterhaus took the field, his task force would consist
of cavalry, infantry and artillery.^ ^
While Ceneral Curtis was explaining the projected rede-
ployment to his subordinates. Major Eli W. Weston thundered
up on a sweat-lathered horse. Entering Asboth's tent, Weston
excitedly informed Curtis tliat one of his outposts north of
Elkhom Tavern had been attacked by Rebel infantry. (Ma-
jor Weston and the soldiers of his 24th Missouri Infantiy were
2» O R Series I Vol. VIII, 199; Dodge, "Personal Biography," I,
49-52.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.; Sigel, "The Pea Ridge Campaign," Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War I 323. Bussey, who called Bloomfield his home, had been
mustered in as colonel of the 3d Iowa Cavalry on August 10, 1861.
Ro.iter and Record of Iowa Soldiers, IV, 441.
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posted at the tavern.) If the Rebels were in force, this could
be disastrous. Since time was all important, Curtis told Colo-
nel Carr to rush a brigade to Weston's assistance. It was
about 10:30 when the meeting broke up and the officers has-
tened to join their units. Aides were sent racing ahead to ac-
quaint the regimental and battery commanders with the de-
cisions which had just been reached.^-
Upon the depaiture of the ranking officers. General Curtis
and his staff assembled on a small knoll near headquarters.
Already the distant rattle of musketry was audible. The gen-
eral's nephew recalled:
Some one asked what would be the name of the battle.
One suggested Sugar Creek, but it was said that a fight
on nearly the same ground, but a few weeks before, had
already received that name. Another suggested the "battle
of the Ozark Movmtains," but is was objected that this
deseribed no particular locahty and covered a vast territory.
"Whatever you call it," said the scout, "the people here
will eall it the battle of Pea Ridge, for that is the name
by which this ridge is known all through this eountry."
"Better eall it Pea Ridge then," said Curtis, and thus a
name was made in history.33
The 24th Missouri, reinforced by two companies of cavalry
(G, 1st Missouri and M, 3d Illinois), had been given the task
of watching the Union rear. In addition, tlie Missourians
guarded Curtis' forward supply depot and a stockade in wliich
a few Confederate prisoners were confined. To cany out tliis
assignment, the regiment camped at Elkhorn Tavern. The
Elkhorn and its outbuildings were used as a "commissary
store-house." On the night of March 6, Major Weston station-
ed cavalry and infantry patrols on the Huntsville and Tele-
graph roads, as well as the Bentonville Detour.^*
About 3 a.m. several of Colonel Cearnal's Rebel troopers
surprised a Union outpost. Wliile the Confederates were es-
corting the bluecoats to the rear, one of them ( Private Thom-
as Welch of Company M, 3d Illinois) gave his captors the
slip. Making his way cross-country, Welch succeeded in
32 O. R., Series 1, Vol. VIII, 199, 258.
33 Samuel P. Curüs, "The Army of the South-West, and the First
Campiagn in Arkansas," Annals of Iowa, Vol. VI, No. I l l , 154.
3-t Ibid., 270-271; Curtis, "The Army of the South-West, and the First
Campaign in Arkansas," Annals of loioa. Vol. VI, No. I l l , 144.
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reaching Elkhorn Tavern, where he reported to Major Wes-
ton.s-^
In the meantime, the major had learned from his scouts
that Gonfederate patrols were operating on the Bentonville—
Sugar Greek road. (This road branched off to the west from
the Telegraph road, about one-fourth mile soutliwest of the
tavern.) He ordered Gaptain Sampson P. Barris to take one
infantry company and the two cavalry companies and recon-
noiter die area west of Elkliom Tavern.
Day was starting to break when Barris left the regimental
command post. Moving ahead of the infantiy, the troopers
discovered a greyclad patrol about three-quarters of a mile
west of the junction. The Gonfederates took cover in the
dense undergrowth south of tlie road. Leaving the road, the
Union footsoldiers advanced into the brush and drove out the
Secessionists. Barris reassembled his patrol on the road and
resumed the march. Beyond G. W. Ford's house, the Federals
again found the Gonfederates. Deploying his infantry to the
left and right of the cavalry whicli remained on the road, Bar-
ris attacked. After a few minutes' hot acüon, the Southerners
swung into tlieir saddles and skedaddled.^*^
The two cavahy companies ( M, 3d Illinois and G, 1st Mis-
souri) followed tlie retreating Gonfederates for some distance
along the Bentonville-Sugar Greek road. Since the greyclads
failed to rally for anotlier stand, the Union horsemen were
unable to overtake them. Gaptain Barris' infantry, to keep
up the bluecoated cavahy, was compelled to double time.
Gaining tlie high ground bet^veen Round Top and Pea Ridge,
the Yankees looking westward saw large numbers of Gonfed-
erates moving along the Bentonville Detour.
At this, the pursuit was abandoned. Barris' infantry and the
cavalry retraced their steps; Gaptain Barbour Lewis of Gom-
pany G, 1st Missouri raced aliead to tell Major Weston what
tlie patrol had discovered. When he reached Elkhorn Tavern,
Lewis found that Weston had gone to Gurtis' headquarters.
Lewis wasted no time in hastening diere, where he reported
all he knew concerning the movements of the Gonfederates.
After complimenting the captain, Weston told him to return
35 O. fl.. Series I, Vol. VIII, 271.
38 Ibid., 271-275, 277. Gaptain Barris commanded Gompany F, 24th
Missouri.
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to Elkhorn Tavern. He would employ his men as scouts to
watch tlie approaches to the tavern from the nortli and east.^ ^
Shortly after the departure of Barris' patrol. Major Weston
had been notified by one of his outposts that a number of
Rebels were advancing down the Telegraph road toward the
tavern. Captain Robert W. Fyan was directed to take his unit
(Company B) and investigate tliis report. Fyan's patrol mov-
ed off at 7 a.m. About three-quarters of a mile north of the
tavern, the Federals sighted a large number of horsemen ap-
proaching from tlie north. Because these troopers wore vari-
ous nondescript types of garb, Fyan found it impossible to
tell whether tliey were friend or foe. Deploying his men to
the left and right of the Telegraph road, Fyan moved forward
to investigate. After advancing almost to the tannery, the
problem was solved. The heretofore unknown cavalrymen
opened fire, wounding one of the Federals. Falling back, Fyan
established a roadblock and called for reinforcements.'^ ^
Upon receiving Fyan's call for help, Weston ordered Lieu-
tenant James J. Lyon to take companies H and I and liuriy
up the Telegraph road. By the time Lyon's panting men
reached the tannery, Fyan had observed that the Confeder-
ates were feeUng for his right Hank. He knew that once the
Rebels gained the high ground south of WilHams Hollow, they
would encounter little difficulty in reaching the Huntsville
road. The captain considered the situation so critical tliat he
decided to abandon the roadblock.
Accompanied by his company and Lyon's command, Fyan
scaled the steep eastern slope of Cross Timber Hollow. Beat-
ing their way through the thick undergrowth, the Federals
reached the Huntsville road ahead of the greyclads. After de-
ploying his men as skirmishers on either side of the road,
Fyan pushed forward as far as the western fringe of Clemens'
field. Here, he ordered his men to take cover. Within a short
time, the bluecoats could hear the Confederates advancing
through the woods between the field and Williams Hollow.
Rebel scouts soon appeared at the edge of the oaks on the
far side of the field.^"
\Vhen he issued marching orders to Lieutenant Lyon, Wes-
37 Ihid., 275, 277.
38 Ihid., 271-275.
39 fcd . , 271, 274-275, 276.
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ton had called for Captain Thomas A. Reed. The captain was
told to turn our Companies A and F and form them on tbe
Telegraph road in front of the tavern. Reed's force would con-
stitute a small strategic reserve, ready to march to any
threatened point on a moment's notice. Fully realizing the
gravity of tbe situation, Weston ordered Captain James R.
Vanzant to take Company K and escort the forty Confederate
prisoners and the wagon train to tbe Pratt's Store area.*"
Witbin a few minutes, Weston bad received reports from
Captain Barns that Confederate patrols had been sighted on
bis left, wbile Fyan's messengers told of tbe greyclads' swing
toward the Huntsville road. Weston directed Captain Reed to
rush the 2d Platoon of Company A up tlie rocky southeastern
face of Pea Ridge. Reed relayed this order to Lieutenant
James L. Robberson.
At a word from tlie lieutenant, the soldiers took their arms
and followed him through the peach orchard bebind the tav-
ern. As soon as his gasping men bad readied tbe crest of tbe
ridge, Robberson deployed them as skirmishers.* ^
Immediately following tbe departure of Robberson's pla-
toon. Major Weston resolved to commit tlie rest of bis re-
serve. Captain Reed was to reinforce Fyan's bluecoats with
Company F and the 1st Platoon of Company A.
When the captain gave the order, tlie soldiers moved down
the Huntsville road about 400 yards and took position in sup-
port of tbeir comrades. Near Clemens' house, they could see
Confederate scouts (Cearnal's troopers) feeling their way
through the underbrush nortb of tbe road. In response to the
pleas of several of his men. Reed gave them permission to
open fire. At the first shot, tbe Confederates began to form
into a line of battle in tbe timber noitheast of Clemens'
In the meantime. Lieutenant Robberson's platoon bad sigbt-
ed Confederates moving tlirougb the thick undergrowth west
of the Telegraph road. He relayed this information to the reg-
imental command post. Witb his situation growing more criti-
cal by the minute, Weston tried to scrape up a few additional
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men. He now learned tliat Captain Barris' company had re-
turned from its sweep westward along the Bentonville-Sugar
Creek road. Barris' bluecoats were rushed to support the
troops opposing the Confederate drive toward the Huntsville
road. Reaching Clemens' field. Barris had his men take cover
behind logs and tiees. Captain Reed's detachment held the
ground on Barris' left.*^
Having committed all his available effectives. Major Wes-
ton anxiously awaited the reinforcements which one of Cur-
tis' staff officers said were hastening up the Telegraph road.
o « a
It was Price's escort which established contact with Cap-
tain Fyan's patrol near the tarmery. At the first shot. Colonel
Cearnal dismounted his battalion. Ceneral Price, who immed-
iately joined his escort, decided against a frontal attack up
the Telegraph road. His scouts had already located a narrow
wood road ascending the ridge which bounded Williams Hol-
low on the south. Price told Cearnal to have his troopers dis-
mount and move up this road. On gaining the ridge, they
were to see if they could tum the Yankees' right flank.
Within a few minutes the Confederates had reached the
high ground. On doing so, tliey were fired on by a mounted
Union patrol (one of Captain Lewis'). The Secessionists re-
plied, and the Yankees beat a huiTied retreat. From this
point, the Rebels were able to look southwestward and see
Elkhom Tavem. Before pushing on, Cearnal notified Price
that here was commanding ground from which the Confeder-
ate artillerists could shell tlie Union position at the head of
Cross Timber Hollow. In addition, Williams Hollow offered a
covered approach for a Confederate advance against the Un-
ion right. Resuming their advance, Cearnal's dismounted
troopers felt their way toward the Huntsville road.*"*
The soldiers of the 2d Missouri, who marched behind Cear-
nal's battalion, had their curiosity whetted by the sight of
several Yatikee pickets. These men, whose horses were still
tied to trees, had been surprised and captiired by tlie Rebel
troopers. Instead of watcliing the road, the Federals were
caught napping "in a little house upon the road-side." Finding
<3 Ibid., 271, 273, 275-276.
4* Ibid., 329; Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brig-
ade, 168,
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themselves suddenly surrounded by men dressed in white,
the bluecoats "seemed bewildered and somewhat frighten-
ed."«
By the time the infantry reached the tanyard, the surgeons
had taken over tlie buildings in expectation of tlie grim har-
vest that was to come.'"^
When Cearnal's troopers were sent up the wood road, the
2d Missouri prepared to take tlie lead. Just as Burbridge's
regiment was getting ready to resume the march up tlie Tele-
graph road, there was a rumble of wheels. One of the soldiers
recalled:
An ox team eame down the hill attached to an old
wagon, having a wood bed with a chickencoop on it: the
driver was a big Federal soldier, who, when captured, put
on an air of the greatest simplicity and seemed perfectly
stupid; he said he was a citizen of the country, and that
the blue clothes he wore were given to him; the distanee
to the Federal eamp and its situation seemed to be un-
kno\\'n to him: a few of the soldiers were coming out with
him after chickens, but had run back after the shooting.
He was very desirous of proeeeding, and expressed great
disappointment when he found his trip for the day was
at an end.'*^
Ceneral Price now learned that the Federals were emplac-
ing several guns (the 1st Battery, Iowa Light Artillery) at
the head of Cross Timber Hollow. These pieces would be able
to rake the Confederate force advancing up the Telegraph
road with a storm of shot and shell. Consequently, Price de-
termined to deploy his command before advancing any far-
ther.
Colonel Little, who rode with the General, was told to form
his brigade to the left and to the right of tlie road. Brigadier
General William Y. Slack was to have his troops take position
on Little's right. This would tlirow slack's troops well up on
to the eastern slope of Pea Ridge. Having learned from Gear-
nal that there was good ground for artillery on the south rim
of ^Villiams Hollow, Price caUed for his staff officers. The
aides were sent galloping off witli instructions for all of
•"^  Anderson, History of the 1st Missouri Confederate Brigade, 168.
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Price's artillery and all the divisions of the Missouri State
Guard that had accompanied tlie general's column on the
night march (except Lindsay's) to take possession of this
commanding ground. By extending his flanks to the right and
to the left. Price hoped to find an opening from which he
could launch a successful attack on what looked to him like a
very formidable position.***
When the Gonfederates left Big Sugar Greek and turned up
Gross Timber Hollow, Price had directed Major D. Herndon
Lindsay to post liis Sixth Division at the mouth of the hollow.
Lindsay's task would be two-fold. He was to guard the Tele-
graph road so that a Union column coming from Keetsville
could not strike the Gonfederates in the rear and he was to
watch Big Sugar Greek Hollow which veered off to the east.*»
Golonel Little quickly formed his combat-ready brigade.His
lead regiment, the 2d Missouri, was deployed as skirmishers
on the right of the Telegraph road. General Slack massed liis
brigade (except for Golonel G. W. Riggins' mounted battal-
ion) in the hollow and on the eastern face of Pea Ridge, be-
hind the 2d Missouri. Little used his cavalry regiment, Golonel
Elijah Gates' 1st Missouri, to support Geamal's advance up
the wood road. Scaling the commanding ridge south of Wil-
liams Hollow, Gates' troopers captured several forge wagons.
Gates halted his command and prepared to hold this key posi-
tion, pending the arrival of the Rebel artillery and the State
Guard. Golonel Benjamin A. Rives, who led Little's other infan-
try regiment, formed his men in close column on the road.-""
From the point where Little deployed his brigade, tlie Tele-
graph road ascended the east slope of Gross Timber Hollow.
Elkhorn Tavern stood near the watershed at the head of tlie
ravine. The ground to the left and right of the road was "very
much broken, covered with a sohd bed of small, white flint
rocks, and a growth of scrubby oak trees, interspersed with oc-
casional thickets" of blackjack."
Assisted by the soldiers of tlie Missouri State Guard the
4s o. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 305. Slack's brigade had followed Little's
on the march around the Union army.
J» Ibid., 322. One four gun battery, Gaptain James G. Gorham s, was
attached to Lindsay's small command.
ROifoid., 307; Anderson, History of the First Missouri Confederate
Brigade, 168-169.
51 Anderson, History of the First Missouri Confederate Brigade, io\).
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Confederate artillerists manhandled their guns up the rugged
wood road which gave access to the south rim of Williams
Hollow. The first two batteries to reach the plateau on top of
the ridge were Captain Francis S. Tull's and the St. Louis
Artillery. Here, just as Ceamal had reported, the Rebel ar-
tillerists found ground from whicli their pieces could com-
mand the Union position at the head of Cross Timber Hollow.
By this time, the Federals had brought up artilleiy ( the 1st
Iowa Battery). Unlimbering tlieir seven guns, tlie Rebel can-
noneers engaged the Iowans in a spirited duel. Two more
Confederate batteries soon reached the rim (Clark's and
Wade's). The boy artillerist. Captain S. Churchill Clark had
his men throw their four brass 6-pounders into battery on the
left of Tull's guns. Wade's cannoneers unlimbered tlieir six
guns on Clark's right.
When Captain Henry Cuibor's Batteiy reached the heights,
the captain was disappointed to find that the four units whicli
had preceded him had pre-empted all tlie good positions. Cui-
bor was unable to find space on tlie rim to put his guns into
battery. His men were compelled to stand-by and watch while
the 17 guns which the Confederates had massed fought a dead-
ly duel with the 1st and 3d Iowa Batteries. It was early after-
noon before Cuibor's gunners were able to place their four
pieces in battery. When they did, they unlimbered them on
the right of Wade's guns.^^
From left to right Clark's, Rains', and Frost's Divisions of
the Missouri State Cuard were massed in support of the artill-
ery. At the same time. Colonel James P. Saunders' Fifth Di-
vision of the State Cuard felt its way toward the Union right.
By 11 a.m. Saunders' soldiers were in position north of the
Huntsville road. During its march to tlie soutlieast, Saunders'
column had been screened by Cearnal's dismounted troopers.
As they closed in on tlie Huntsville road, tlie Confederates
were fired on by Major Weston's skinnishers. Preparatory
to attacking. Colonel Saunders told the commander of his
attached battery (Captain Joseph Kelly) to have his men park
their guns."'''
"2 o R. Series I, Vol. VIII, 307, 319, 323, 327; Anderson, History of
the First Missouri Confederate Brigade, 169-170. Glark, a great grandson
of the famous explorer, had resigned from the U. S. Military Academy
and joined the Missouri secessionists.
33 O. R., Series I, Vol. VIII, 307, 321, 329.
Museum Notes
Without question, the greatest single service the museum
has provided over the years is to the thousands of school,
cburch, and club groups that travel to the museum from ev-
ery part of tbe state to learn about tlie bistory of Iowa. Oc-
casionally, as many as 40 or more groups tour tlie building
in a single day. To enable the museum to adequately handle
the steadily increasing number of groups visiting tlie depart-
ment, a ti-aining program is in effect to furtber the knowledge
of the guards on the objects and specimens in tbe museum
displays and thus better enable tbem to answer questions
and to explain these exliibits to visitors. Due to tbe fact that
the building is open every day of the year, it is necessary
tliat our guide-guard personnel be available at all times, both
for the protection of the exhibits and the safety of the public.
While it is expected that new and interesting objects will
be periodically added to tbe Museum, it is also unfoitunately
true tbat occasionally objects are removed.
Recently a young man who had earned, over a period of
years, the trust of the staff, admitted the theft of a number
of antique guns from the study collection of tbe museum.
This young man was a serious student of antique weapons
and had used the study collection to aid him in making re-
productions of these guns. Most of the stolen guns have been
traced and will be returned, but the fact that it did happen
has caused serious re-evaluation of security at the Historical
Building. These following steps have been taken.
All guns in the display cases have been individually elec-
trically wired to discourage any attempt to break into the
cases and remove them.
No person shall be allowed in other than the public sections
of the building unless he is continuously accompanied by a
member of the staff.
While it would be wise to increase the small staff of secur-
ity police we have guarding tbe building, tbe money appro-
priated for running the department will not permit it. We
must trust that those steps we have been able to take will
prove effective in preventing furtber thefts.
590

